Hogan Lovell OffshoreBook 2023 230809 OnlinePDF - Flipbook - Page 100
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France
conditions stated by the call for tender’s
specifications, including abandonment
costs if the project is cancelled – except
where due to the producer’s default. 50 This
provision applies for tendering procedures
for which a tender notice was published
after 1st January 2016.
5.4 Consequences of delays
and disruptions of the
grid connection system
The producer/operator of the OWF is protected against the consequences of delays
as well as disruptions of the GCS by the
transport network operator.
Nevertheless, the aforementioned law dated
10 August 2018 has equally changed the
rules for OWF launched under the previous,
first two calls for tenders. Under article 58 of
this law, RTE shall bear the connection costs
under conditions similar to those applicable
for the more recent tenders. The grid connection component of the purchase price
stated in the first and second tenders was
therefore removed.
In case of delays in the GCS, for the first
and second public tenders, the successful
bidder is entitled to receive compensation
for its prejudice resulting from a delay in grid
connection. The compensation paid by RTE
covers the financing costs and extra costs,
and extra costs of design, development and
implementation of the production installation. 51
As a result, RTE currently bears the grid
connection costs for all of the OWF projects
implemented through a public tender. Such
costs are funded through RTE’s regulated
asset base regime, i.e., the general tariff for
the use of electric grids (in French: "tarif
d’utilisation des réseaux électriques" – "TURPE") which also happens to be paid by the
final users, through an incentive regulation
mechanism aiming to control investment
costs. The TURPE is regulated by the CRE
which checks that it only covers RTEs expenses that an "effective" network operator
would have been exposed to in the same
conditions.
For the third public tender (Dunkirk OWF)
and the following ones, RTE shall also pay
compensation to the producer/operator for
its losses incurred as a result of a delay in the
completion of the grid connection, provided that such delay is not caused by force
majeure or by an event attributable to the
producers and impacting the connection
works. 52 In principle, the producer receives a
monthly prepayment of 80% of its financial
loss corresponding to the electricity that
could not have been injected in the grid, but
still supports a deductible corresponding
to 10% of its loss. However, the specific modalities of the compensation stated in each
tender specification, if any, shall prevail on
these general provisions.
50 For example, under the third public tender, the amount of the indemnification in case of producer’s default is a fixed amount going from 15 to 75
million Euro, depending on the moment of the withdrawal of the project.
51 Article R. 342-4-10 of the Energy Code.
52 Articles L.342-3 and D.342-4-12 of the Energy Code.
